New Delhi:
It’s not just about bilateral deals or diplomatic ceremonies; it’s about the significance of PM Modi’s visit and his impact on the region. The three-nation stops collectively highlight India’s emerging aspirations to become a key determinant of the geo-strategic future of the Indo-Pacific, the region that has become the epicenter of global geo-strategic competition.
The destinations that are selected provide an insight into how their relationship is going. Indonesia is a country that is positioned in some of the busiest maritime trade routes in the world, while Australia is one of India’s closest strategic partners of India in the Indo-Pacific region. New Zealand is emerging as an important partner in the Pacific region. Combined, they highlight New Delhi’s push for greater stakes in an area where economic stakes, maritime security and great power competition are increasingly intertwined.
The timing is also important. While China appears intent on extending its footprint through ports, infrastructure projects and strategic investments under its “String of Pearls” policy, India is quietly pursuing another vision for the region – one based on partnerships, maritime cooperation and rules-based order, not permanent military bases and debt-driven infrastructure.
The Indian Ocean has been a major focus of discussion regarding power in the region for years, primarily concerning China’s “String of Pearls”. It refers to Beijing’s expanding port network, infrastructure investments, and strategic alliances in the South China and Arabian Seas, which many analysts think could be extended to accommodate a larger Chinese Navy.
Now the situation is different; China is no longer the sole determining factor of the strategic landscape.
India has been quietly developing a wider Indo-Pacific policy over the last few years, which aims to provide an alternative to China’s policy. New Delhi has been more focused on establishing partnerships, bolstering maritime security, enhancing defence cooperation, and emerging as a reliable regional stakeholder, rather than depending on overseas military bases or massive infrastructure investments.
This has led to a growing contestation of two conflicting visions of the Indo-Pacific.
Understanding China’s “String of Pearls”
The term “String of Pearls” was first used in the strategic vocabulary in the middle of the last decade to define China’s expansion efforts in the Indian Ocean Region through investments in ports and marine infrastructure. These commercial initiatives could eventually give Beijing logistical assistance for war plans, analysts said, and help to secure sea lanes transporting a significant portion of China’s trade and energy supplies.
The standout examples include China’s first foreign navy base in Djibouti, the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and the Kyaukpyu Port in Myanmar. Many of these projects also connect to Beijing’s flagship international infrastructure initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
China is steadfastly asserting that the investments are purely commercial and that they are made in the interests of regional connectivity and economic growth. But several strategic experts say that many of these installations have “dual use” potential that could aid China in naval deployments during a crisis.
India’s Response Has Been Different
India has chosen not to mirror China’s strategy.
In 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi formally introduced India’s Indo-Pacific vision in the 18th Shangri-La Dialogue, which called for a ‘free, open, inclusive and rules-based’ Indo-Pacific. In contrast to traditional military alliances, Indian practice is based on the concepts of freedom of navigation, respect for international law, ASEAN centrality, and respect for the sovereignty of all nations.
This vision has now been transformed into a fully-fledged package of diplomacy, defence cooperation, maritime security, connectivity and economic partnerships.
The Quad And Strategic Partnerships
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) involving India, the United States, Japan, and Australia is one of the most visible aspects of India’s Indo-Pacific policy.
Beijing perceived the Quad as an ad hoc alliance, and the agenda has been gradually expanding. It now co-operates in maritime domain awareness, cyber security, disaster relief, critical technologies, resilient supply chains, financing of infrastructure, and clean energy.
One key point: The Quad is not a military alliance. There is no mutual defence clause, and India has the opportunity to strengthen strategic partnerships while maintaining the policy of strategic autonomy.
Access Without Overseas Bases
India’s logistics arrangements with countries such as the United States, France, Australia, Japan, and Singapore will enable their ships to refuel, maintain, and operate in the Indo-Pacific region.
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are also important, as they are near one of the world’s more heavily trafficked maritime choke points and a key point for China’s energy imports: the Strait of Malacca. They are strategically deployed to boost India’s maritime presence and operations in the eastern Indian Ocean.
In parallel, India has deepened cooperation in the Indian Ocean with Indian Ocean island countries like Seychelles, Mauritius, and Maldives and bolstered naval ties in the western Indian Ocean.
Winning Influence Through Partnerships
As opposed to China’s infrastructure-led approach, India has increasingly turned to diplomacy and capacity building.
India’s footprint in the region is being enhanced through various initiatives like SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) activities, vaccine diplomacy, and maritime capacity-building programmes.
During the various anti-piracy operations deployed by the Indian Navy in the Gulf of Aden, disaster response and evacuation missions in the region during various crises have strengthened New Delhi’s perception of its own reliability as a first responder.
India’s model provides an opportunity for several smaller Indian Ocean countries to diversify their strategic partnerships without having too much reliance on a single major power.
Why Southeast Asia Matters
India’s Act East Policy has been gradually expanded to become a more comprehensive Indo-Pacific engagement policy.
Defence cooperation has been brought to a new level with Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines, with joint military exercises and defence dialogues, defence and maritime cooperation, and a shared increase in defence trade.
New Delhi has increasingly been developing partnerships with regional partners to enhance interoperability, build resilient supply chains and establish trusted technology partnerships, which are seen as vital to minimizing overreliance on China.
Not An Anti-China Alliance
While India is increasingly seen as pursuing a “Quad-plus” position in the Indo-Pacific, it does not appear to have sought to define its strategy in a manner that would involve an anti-China front.
Despite the lack of resolution in some border issues and the growing Navy presence in the Indian Ocean by China, New Delhi has not been deterred from involving Beijing in cooperation bodies like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
India’s underlying principle of multi-alignment, of establishing relations with several powers around the world and making independent decisions, is also reflected in this.
The Bigger Picture
The Indo-Pacific has become the new battleground in the 21st-century geopolitical struggle.
China still has several strengths, such as its vastly superior infrastructure financing and production capabilities, as well as its swift naval modernization. India, on the other hand, is promoting another model: a partnership-based model, a trusted model of diplomacy, a maritime model, a regional security model.
It’s not just about ports, deployment, or military power in that respect.
The Indo-Pacific is increasingly a competition between the type of regional order that takes shape.
China has been investing in strategic infrastructure and maritime connectivity under its “String of Pearls” initiative to expand its influence, while India’s “Indo-Pacific” strategy emphasizes promoting cooperation, sovereign equality, and diversified partnerships to build a “rules-based order.”
The big question as geopolitical competition grows in the Indian Ocean and broader Indo-Pacific is not who owns the most ports, but who has the most trust in the region.
