US President Donald Trump’s decision to extend the ceasefire with Iran indefinitely, as both sides search for a continuation of dialogue amidst a standoff over the Strait of Hormuz, has once again put Pakistan at the centre of a delicate diplomatic position as it plays the role of conduit between the Ayatollah and Trump.
The diplomatic position Rawalpindi, and by association Islamabad, today finds itself in is expected to be a boon for the embattled country’s international standing – but also, perhaps more narrowly, help it return into the good graces of the Middle East. This is both an enviable and challenging space to be in for the only Islamic nation in the world that has nuclear weapons. Anchoring these political overtures, at least in part, is a defence deal that Pakistan in 2025 signed with its long-standing patron and partner in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia. The deal saw mobilisation of a few thousand Pakistani soldiers accompanied by a fleet of fighter jets to bolster its Arab partner’s defences amidst a US-Iran war that has spilt over across the region.
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The Saudis have maintained a delicate balance in the war despite their energy installations being targeted, and have postured in a way that indicates a realisation that the crisis with Iran is one for the long term and not something the current conflict will necessarily resolve. Continuing to have a diplomatic presence, followed by a China-brokered normalisation of ties between Riyadh and Tehran in 2023, allows Saudi Arabia to keep a door ajar at a time when the probability of Iran gaining an upper hand in the Gulf security architecture remains high. While Iran’s leadership maintains that it seeks good relations with its neighbours, for the Gulf states, Iran, with a Shia-majority population of over 93 million people and as the 17th largest country in the world, has always presented a bigger security challenge.
Amidst the noise encapsulating the war, especially that coming from the White House, on April 9, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud and his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, held a phone conversation. This, in fact, was a precursor and foundational exchange for allowing Pakistan’s military leader, Field Marshal Asim Munir, to become a host and allow Islamabad to position itself as a self-styled mediator. From the perspective of the US – with Trump already bowled over by Munir’s “flair” and Pakistan’s role as a strategic toady – ingratiating the American leader with kind and an inherent lack of self-respect, by allowing him ‘victories’ in way of subscribing to his idea that the 2025 military exchange with arch-rival India was the eighth war he stopped, Pakistan offered a relatively low-risk entry into a renewed diplomatic track. To take the strategic flattery further, Pakistan is perhaps the only second country on record suggesting that Trump should indeed receive the Nobel Peace Prize – an award the US president has made no bones about wanting to be felicitated with. That the US, over the decades, has continued to fall prey to the same Pakistani game time and again is an indictment of the Pentagon’s hubris of wanting to be the sole hegemonic power in the world. This is despite internal divisions, specifically amongst MAGA supporters, over whether the US should continue play the role of the world’s policeman or not.
The cost of failure for Pakistan if Iran and the US return to a military conflict is also minimal. For, costs can be imposed only if there is anything at all available to impose them against. A Pakistani headline in its own press recently read: “Pakistan returned $2 billion debt to the United Arab Emirates by taking a new debt from Saudi Arabia”.
Irrespective of the success of US-Iran talks, Rawalpindi, for its own narrow interests, has further strengthened the Pakistan Army’s role as the main political actor in the state it runs. However, it now benefits from the fact that the Iran war has pushed concerns around long-term security for the Arab states into the limelight. Pakistan has a nuclear status, along with hardened and battle-tested armed forces, and economic destitution that can be leveraged by petrodollars. For the Saudis, for example, Pakistan has been a military backend for long – one that they have funded for decades. From helping clear out the 1979 Siege of Mecca by militants led by Juhayman al-Otaybi to sending troops to protect Mecca and Medina itself during the first Gulf War in 1990, Pakistan has fully utilised its curious combination of military strength and Islam to navigate the region’s geopolitics in a bid to keep its economy afloat.
Amidst all this, Iran has its own mistrusts with Pakistan. There are Iranian power ecosystems that quip about Pakistan not being an Islamic country altogether. Tehran and Rawalpindi had a short military exchange in early 2024, and even amidst the current kerfuffle, the Iranian press linked to the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has reported busting a terror cell following infiltration from Pakistan’s border. The differences run deep. But today, both nations, prisoners of geography as they are, are driven by mutually beneficial short-term gains.
Over the past few years, Pakistan has seen itself slide out of favour in the Gulf. The US-Iran war has changed that. Munir and company have taken full advantage of it. But expecting this moment to change long-term fortunes for Pakistan is questioning history itself.
(Kabir Taneja is Executive Director of the Observer Research Foundation Middle East)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
